

[illegible]

# Auctions: Taxonomy

Game Theory Course:  
Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

# Motivation

- Auctions are any mechanisms for allocating resources among self-interested agents
- Very widely used
  - government sale of resources
  - privatization
  - stock market
  - request for quote
  - FCC spectrum
  - real estate sales
  - eBay



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- ## Auctions: Taxonomy

# Some Canonical Auctions

- English
- Japanese
- Dutch
- First-Price
- Second-Price
- All-Pay



# English Auction



## English Auction

- auctioneer starts the bidding at some “reservation price”
- bidders then shout out ascending prices
- once bidders stop shouting, the high bidder gets the good at that price

# Japanese Auction

## Japanese Auction

- Same as an English auction except that the auctioneer calls out the prices
  - all bidders start out standing
  - when the price reaches a level that a bidder is not willing to pay, that bidder sits down
    - once a bidder sits down, they can't get back up
  - the last person standing gets the good
- 
- analytically more tractable than English because jump bidding can't occur
    - consider the branching factor of the extensive form game...

Game Theory Online



# Dutch Auction



## Dutch Auction

- the auctioneer starts a clock at some high value; it descends
- at some point, a bidder shouts “mine!” and gets the good at the price shown on the clock

# First-, Second-Price Auctions



## First-Price Auction

- bidders write down bids on pieces of paper
- auctioneer awards the good to the bidder with the highest bid
- that bidder pays the amount of his bid

## Second-Price Auction

- bidders write down bids on pieces of paper
- auctioneer awards the good to the bidder with the highest bid
- that bidder pays the amount bid by the second-highest bidder

cooperative payoff utility  
 avoid decision modeling paradoxes  
 Bayesian Normal-form auctions  
 Game Nash equilibrium class players  
 Theory  
 predator rational math  
 strategies zero-sum probability Online  
 repeated sufficient common  
 science economics  
 formal game theory  
 extensive-form rational  
 random action  
 optimal decision policy

## All-Pay Auction

- bidders write down bids on pieces of paper
- auctioneer awards the good to the bidder with the highest bid
- everyone pays the amount of their bid regardless of whether or not they win

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# Auctions as Structured Negotiations



Any negotiation mechanism that is:

- **market-based** (determines an exchange in terms of currency)
- **mediated** (auctioneer)
- **well-specified** (follows rules)


Defined by three kinds of rules:

- rules for bidding
- rules for what information is revealed
- rules for clearing

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- rules for **bidding**
  - who can bid, when
  - what is the form of a bid
  - restrictions on offers, as a function of:
    - bidder's own previous bid
    - auction state (others' bids)
    - eligibility (e.g., budget constraints)
    - expiration, withdrawal, replacement
- rules for what information is revealed
- rules for clearing

# Auctions as Structured Negotiations



Defined by three kinds of rules:

- rules for bidding
- rules for **what information is revealed**
  - when to reveal what information to whom
- rules for clearing

# Auctions as Structured Negotiations



Defined by three kinds of rules:

- rules for bidding
- rules for what information is revealed
- rules for **clearing**
  - when to clear
    - at intervals
    - on each bid
    - after a period of inactivity
  - allocation (who gets what)
  - payment (who pays what)