



[illegible]

Domination

- Let s_i and s'_i be two strategies for player i , and let S_{-i} be is the set of all possible strategy profiles for the other players
 - What's a “strategy”?
 - For now, just choosing an action (“pure strategy”)



Domination



- Let s_i and s'_i be two strategies for player i , and let S_{-i} be the set of all possible strategy profiles for the other players
 - What's a “strategy”?
 - For now, just choosing an action (“pure strategy”)

Definition

s_i **strictly dominates** s'_i if $\forall s_{-i} \in S_{-i}, u_i(s_i, s_{-i}) > u_i(s'_i, s_{-i})$

Definition

s_i **very weakly dominates** s'_i if $\forall s_{-i} \in S_{-i}, u_i(s_i, s_{-i}) \geq u_i(s'_i, s_{-i})$

Equilibria and dominance

- If one strategy dominates all others, we say it is **dominant**.
- A strategy profile consisting of dominant strategies for every player must be a Nash equilibrium.
 - An equilibrium in strictly dominant strategies must be unique.



Game Theory

Bayesian Normal-form auctions
equilibrium class rational math
strategies zero-sum probability Online
predator Nash games paper Extensive-form random action
tragedy of the commons repeated
cooperative payoff utility
added curses avoiding parades
coincidence behavioral past experience indifferent autism
action coordination boring game epistemic status epistemic status theory

-
- Game Theory
- Bayesian Normal-form auctions
equilibrium class rational math
strategies zero-sum probability Online
predator Nash games paper Extensive-form random action
tragedy of the commons repeated
cooperative payoff utility
added curses avoiding parades
coincidence behavioral past experience indifferent autism
action coordination boring game epistemic status epistemic status theory

	C	D
C	$-1, -1$	$-4, 0$
D	$0, -4$	$-3, -3$